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Until recently, most of our understanding
about human tool use has come from left
brain-damaged patients, particularly those
who show difficulties in actually using
familiar tools (hereafter referred to as
apraxia of tool use). These difficulties have
been suggested to result from impaired
sensorimotor knowledge about manipula-
tion (Rothi et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001;
Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010; Binkofski
and Buxbaum, 2013). The manipulation
knowledge hypothesis is very close to the
stable affordance hypothesis, that is, the
idea that the mere observation of a tool
is sufficient to automatically extract sta-
ble affordances, namely, invariant features
of the tool (i.e., its functional meaning),
leading to the activation of the canoni-
cal motor action (e.g., Bub et al., 2008;
Borghi and Riggio, 2009; Pellicano et al.,
2011). In this article, I discuss the viability
of the hypothesis that impaired manipu-
lation knowledge/stable affordances might
be the core deficit of apraxia of tool use.
Manipulation knowledge is supposed
to contain information about the move-
ments associated with the canonical
manipulation of a familiar tool (e.g., for a
hammer, a broad oscillation of the elbow
joint; Buxbaum, 2001). This information
is viewed as egocentric, because it spec-
ifies the user-tool relationship. On this
basis, a parallel has been drawn between
the notions of manipulation knowledge
and motor affordances (Bub et al., 2008;
Borghi and Riggio, 2009; Pellicano et al.,
2011). To interact with a tool, some infor-
mation such as the orientation of the tool
has to be processed online, because it does
not represent a permanent characteris-
tic. Thus, orientation can be considered
as an instance of temporary affordance,
processed by the dorso-dorsal stream.
Nevertheless, we also have to determine
what is the typical orientation of a tool
to use it (e.g., the canonical orienta-
tion of a book to read it). This typical
orientation would be rather based on
stable/permanent/canonical affordances,
such as shape and size. These stable affor-
dances would involve information stored
in memory and might be processed by
the ventral, or more particularly, the
ventro-dorsal stream (see Borghi and
Riggio, 2009; Ferri et al., 2011; Borghi,
2012; Myachykov et al., 2013). In sum,
whereas the manipulation knowledge
hypothesis focuses on the motor parame-
ters associated with tool manipulation, the
stable affordance hypothesis emphasizes
the tools’ properties useful for a specific
manipulation. Whatever, both hypotheses
assume that canonical/permanent/stable
stored information can be associated with
the manipulation of a specific tool, and is
a potential basis for the conception of tool
actions1 (Figure 1).
Growing evidence indicates that left
brain-damaged patients with apraxia of
tool use are impaired to solve mechanical
problems, consisting in selecting among
several novel tools the one appropriate to
lift a cylinder or to extract a target out from
a box (Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998;
1In recent years, a distinction has been made between
volumetric/structural vs. functional gestures (e.g.,
Bub et al., 2008; Buxbaum and Kalénine, 2010; Jax
and Buxbaum, 2010). Volumetric/structural gestures
correspond to the hand postures used to grasp an
object/tool to move it whereas functional gestures cor-
respond to the manipulation of a tool in accordance
with its conventional use. This distinction does not
fully mirror the stable versus temporary affordances
distinction because both volumetric/structural and
functional gestures are based on the perception of sta-
ble affordances, such as shape or size. Therefore, I will
only focus on stable affordances that can be perceived
to use tools in a conventional way (i.e., the canonical
manipulation of a tool).
Goldenberg and Hagmann, 1998;
Hartmann et al., 2005; Goldenberg and
Spatt, 2009; Jarry et al., 2013; Osiurak
et al., 2013; see also Osiurak et al., 2009).
These difficulties are associated neither
with a dysexecutive syndrome, nor with
frontal lobe damage (Goldenberg and
Hagmann, 1998; Hartmann et al., 2005;
Goldenberg et al., 2007; Jarry et al., 2013;
Osiurak et al., 2013). In other words, the
ability to use both familiar and novel tools
might be supported by a common cog-
nitive process. An important question
is whether the manipulation knowl-
edge/stable affordances hypothesis is a
good candidate for this common process.
At least two theoretical arguments can be
offered to conclude that the answer is no.
First, manipulation knowledge and sta-
ble affordances are supposed to be associ-
ated with a specific tool, more particularly
with its canonical manipulation. Given
that mechanical problems consist of novel
tools, there is no reason that manipulation
knowledge supports the solving of these
problems. Pellicano et al. (2011) proposed
a somewhat more subtle perspective, by
assuming that, in some cases, the canon-
ical, familiar tool associated with a usual
action can be absent (e.g., to stir coffee in
the absence of a spoon). In this case, the
usage context might help the user to select
among the available tools (e.g., a knife) the
one with the most similar structure to the
canonical tool (e.g., a spoon). Again, this
proposal cannot be applied to the use of
novel tools to solve mechanical problems,
given that there is no usual context, and no
canonical tool associated with the solution
of the problem.
Second, manipulation knowledge and
stable affordances are thought to be
egocentric, in that they specify the rela-
tionship between the user and the tool.
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FIGURE 1 | The manipulation knowledge/stable affordances hypothesis (A) and the mechanical knowledge hypothesis (B).
For instance, Pellicano et al. (2011, p.
1) defined stable affordances as “the
potentiation of motor interactions con-
sistent with the conventional use of a
perceived tool.” The problem is that, to
solve mechanical problems, patients have
to form an allocentric representation of
the tool solution (e.g., a hooking action
involves the relationship between a hook
and something that can be hooked). So at a
theoretical level, the manipulation knowl-
edge/stable affordances hypothesis cannot
explain how this allocentric representation
can be formed.
An alternative to the manipulation
knowledge/stable affordances hypothesis
can be proposed [Osiurak et al., 2010,
2011; Osiurak, 2013; for a somewhat sim-
ilar view, see Goldenberg (2013)]. This
alternative is based on three assumptions.
First, when people intend to use tools,
the conception of the tool action is not
supported by knowledge about the ego-
centric user-tool relationship. Rather, the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 890 | 2
Osiurak Apraxia of tool use and affordances
conception is based on mechanical knowl-
edge, that is, knowledge about abstract
mechanical principles, such as hooking,
lever, and percussion. This knowledge is
thought to be allocentric, because it speci-
fies the relationship between the different
elements of the environment. After all,
once people understand the lever princi-
ple, they do not need to get a hypothet-
ical, canonical tool to carry out a lever
action. Instead, they seek among the dif-
ferent “available” tools, which are imme-
diately within the workspace or not, the
one appropriate to the present situation.
Said differently, this proposal is the inverse
of what Pellicano et al. (2011) suggested:
It is not the representation of the sta-
ble affordances linked to a canonical tool
that guides the search of the appropriate
tool; rather, it is the representation of the
physical properties useful for achieving
the present goal that guides the search of
the appropriate tool, whether the canon-
ical tool is within the workspace or not.
Interestingly, evidence indicates that the
ventro-dorsal stream supports mechan-
ical knowledge (Goldenberg and Spatt,
2009; Goldenberg, 2013). And, impaired
mechanical knowledge might be the core
deficit of apraxia of tool use.
This leads me to the second assump-
tion: The ability to get appropriate tools
that are not within the workspace is sup-
ported by what is commonly called seman-
tic knowledge about tool function (Rothi
et al., 1991; Buxbaum, 2001; Buxbaum
and Kalénine, 2010). This knowledge spec-
ifies the purpose, recipient, and context
wherein a tool can be used, and is com-
monly associated to the ventral stream.
Evidence indicates that patients with a
selective semantic deficit are able to actu-
ally use tools, when presented with the
corresponding objects (e.g., a hammer
with a nail; Buxbaum et al., 1997; Lauro-
Grotto et al., 1997; Osiurak et al., 2008;
Silveri and Ciccarelli, 2009). However,
when the tool is presented in isolation,
difficulties can occur, and are strongly
linked to the semantic deficit (Sirigu et al.,
1991; Hodges et al., 2000; Osiurak et al.,
2008; see also Lesourd et al., 2013). In
a way, those patients are able to deter-
mine through mechanical reasoning how
the tools and objects can be used together.
However, when tools are presented in iso-
lation, they cannot determine the usual
use, because knowledge about the social
usages is impaired. Thus, those patients
can attempt, on the basis of spared
mechanical knowledge, to show that a key
can be used for scrapping the chamfered
edge of a wooden desk or a nail clip-
per can be used to attach several sheets
of paper together (Sirigu et al., 1991;
Osiurak et al., 2008). In other words,
semantic knowledge about tool function
can be viewed as another form of allo-
centric knowledge, linking the different
tools and objects with the other tools
and objects used for the same context or
usage (Osiurak et al., 2010, 2011). Thus,
when no tool is immediately available (i.e.,
within the workspace) to carry out an
intended action, semantic knowledge can
be requested to “mentally travel” over the
different semantic categories in search of
a potential appropriate tool. In sum, while
mechanical knowledge specifies how tools
and objects work together to carry out
the utilization per se, semantic knowledge
provides information about the different
spaces wherein tools and objects can be
found, thereby organizing the search in
memory.
The third assumption is that the
perception of affordances (and their actu-
alization) only aims to translate the rep-
resentation of the tool action elaborated
through mechanical knowledge (e.g., that
the hammer has to make a specific motion
to pound a nail) into precise motor pro-
grams, linking in an egocentric way the
user with the tool. This perspective is con-
sistent with the ecological approach to per-
ception, which assumes that affordances
are animal-relative properties of the envi-
ronment that are not created in the act
of perception, but exist independent of it
(Gibson, 1979). So people do not system-
atically or automatically perceive all the
affordances that the environment offers to
them, but rather only the affordances that
are suitable for reaching a current goal
[Shaw et al., 1982; Shaw, 2003; Osiurak
and Badets, 2014; for a somewhat similar
view, see also Tipper et al. (2006), Pellicano
et al. (2010), and Ellis et al. (2013)]. In
other words, the relevant affordances are
directly perceived in accordance with the
current goal. For instance, among themul-
titude of affordances that a hammer can
offer, people can perceive it as move-able
in a vertical plane, when attempting to
pound a nail, but they can also per-
ceive it as throw-able when attempting to
defend themselves against attackers. Here,
the move-ability and throw-ability of the
hammer are affordances, but they are per-
ceived only in function of the current
goal. In this frame, affordances are nec-
essarily stable, because they correspond
to the “negative” of our biomechanical
capacities. But, they are also temporary
because they are perceived only in func-
tion of a specific goal. In sum, there are no
stable neither temporary affordances, but
only affordances. The corollary is that no
affordances about the canonical manipu-
lation of tools can be stored, because they
are not engaged in the conception of the
tool action per se, but are only a way for
people to reify the conceptual representa-
tion of the action into the physical world.
This perspective is much more consistent
with the idea that the dorso-dorsal stream
is precisely in charge of perceiving and
actualizing affordances (see Young, 2006;
Figure 1).
To conclude, apraxia of tool use, char-
acterized by conceptual errors in the use of
tools, might be not amatter of affordances.
Rather, the perception/actualization of
affordances would only be involved in
the translation of the allocentric, tool
action representation into specific, ego-
centric sensorimotor actions. In fact, in
the field of apraxia, the only disorder
that might be related to impaired per-
ception/actualization of affordances might
be motor apraxia, a disorder affecting
the motor coordination mainly of distal
movements. Motor apraxia is one of the
clinical signs of cortico-basal degenera-
tion (Zadikoff and Lang, 2005). Perhaps,
an interesting avenue for future research
would be to explore how those patients
perceive affordances as usually assessed by
the ecological approach to visual percep-
tion (e.g., Carello et al., 1989).
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